Models of …scal federalism rarely account for the multitude of real-world intergovernmental arrangements when assessing the e¢ ciency implications of tax competition; in particular for federal tax policy. This paper shows that …scal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue-sharing, and …scal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourages taxation locally, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending in …scal federalism. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, …scal institutions reduce con…scatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) . Finally, we characterize the e¢ cient design of intergovernmental …scal ties.
Introduction
Intergovernmental budgetary ties are widely observed in federally organized states. For instance, the German federal and municipal governments occupy (nearly) the same tax base for corporate taxation where the …scal interdependence is strengthened by a federal tax deductibility provision.
Municipal governments share locally collected business tax revenues with the federal level and receive equalizing transfers. Provinces in Canada are linked through …scal equalization and at the same time levy a business tax in addition to the federal government. The federal government furthermore allows for the deduction of provincial payroll and capital taxes under the federal corporate tax. Similarly, the U.S. state and federal governments co-occupy the personal income tax base where the U.S. state income taxes (among other state taxes) are deductible from the federal income tax base.
Despite its …scal importance the way intergovernmental …scal ties in ‡uence federal taxing incentives has received little attention so far. Existing literature on …scal federalism (to be reviewed in detail below) either resorts to taxing incentives by local governments or, when a federal level is explicitly considered, generically abstracts from intergovernmental …scal relations. The present paper tries to …ll the gap. In doing so, we set up a two-tier federal system where both layers engage in capital tax competition. Importantly, we allow for …scal equalization, vertical tax revenuesharing, as well as federal deductibility of locally-paid taxes to link public budgets horizontally and vertically. The paper's results are as follows: Horizontal and vertical …scal ties upwardly distort local tax rate choices. Fiscal arrangement either insulate the local budget from capital mobility or allow the local tax burden to be exported onto the federal level. Both e¤ects manipulate the local cost of taxation downwards; possibly leading to an overprovision of local public services in tax competition.
As a mirror image, federal public services will be unambiguously underprovided in the presence of …scal ties. In fact, they tend to reinforce the e¤ect of tax competition to raise the federal government's cost of taxing capital. The rationale is that …scal ties additionally expose the federal budget to capital mobility and reduce federal funds due to the partial export of the local tax burden onto the federal level. We further look into the issue of how the structure of government spending (federal vs. local spending) responds to intergovernmental …scal ties. As budgetary linkages become …scally more important, the structure of public spending becomes more skewed towards local spending. In fact, the local public services may well be overprovided relative to the federal service. The result is contrary to the general notion that in the presence of tax competition local governments will more strongly underprovide public services relative to the federal level. We further …nd that …scal ties tend to induce a strategic complementarity between local and federal taxes. The result is of relevance when, e.g., the federal level is able to pre-commit towards local governments. Now, if the federal government views local taxes to be too high, it will generically decrease the federal tax rate below the level which it …nds optimal in the absence of a pre-commitment capacity; a tendency which further reduces federal service provision. Our …ndings bear an interesting relation to the literature on Leviathan-type governments. The dichotomy of taxing incentives inherent to intergovernmental …scal arrangements implies that stronger interbudgetary links strengthen taxing incentives at the local level, but undermine taxing incentives at the federal level. The latter …nding is in contrast to the Cartelization Hypothesis by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) which stipulates the …scal ties implicitly induces collusion between governments with the consequence of higher con…scatory taxes.
So far, an integrated analysis of how …scal institutions a¤ect federal taxing incentives has not been presented. Instead, existing literature analyzes local tax incentives in the presence of intergovernmental …scal arrangements or jointly analyze local and federal tax incentives, but in the absence of intergovernmental …scal arrangements. In detail, the seminal paper by Gordon (1983) systematically describes the variety of ine¢ ciencies which can arise from lower-level decision-making. The extent to which local tax incentives are in ‡uenced by …scal equalization is investigated in Smart (1998). Therein, schemes which equalize taxing capacities are shown to reduce the perceived elasticity of the local tax base. This e¤ect mitigates undertaxation in horizontal …scal competition since the tax base elasticity is overestimated with resource mobility; see Koethenbuerger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) . 1 Grazzini and Petretto (2005) provide a combined analysis of revenue-sharing and …scal equalization and its impact on local policy. 2 An explicit analysis of federal decision making is not presented in this body of literature. Di¤erently, Flowers (1988) and Wrede (1996) explicitly model the federal and local government. They show that with Leviathan governments a tax base overlap yields too high tax rates. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) argue that the result might extend to the case of benevolent governments even when tax competition operates locally. 3 Intergovernmental …scal arrangements make no appearance in these contributions. To the best of our knowledge, the only contributions with an explicit modelling of federal tax policy and intergovernmental …scal arrangements are Dahlby et al. (2000) and Hat…eld (2007) .
They characterize the Pigouvian-type deductibility rate which corrects for local disincentives to spend on public services. 4 Di¤erently, we also consider revenue-sharing and …scal equalization systems and their impact on the e¢ ciency of public service provision in the presence of a mobile tax base. Furthermore, when we analyze the optimal choice of the deductibility rate, then the rate is primarily needed to correct federal rather than local taxing incentives.
The plan of the paper is as follows: The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the local tax policy. Section 4 analyzes federal tax policy in …scal federalism, while Section 5 discusses some extensions of the basic set-up. Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks. 1 From the perspective of a benevolent government the optimally chosen equalization rate appropriately insulates local governments from capital mobility; see e.g. Koethenbuerger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) . Interestingly, when the federal government's motivation is more of a Leviathan-type, the federal layer will strategically use the equalization rate to extract revenues from local governments . 2 There is a steadily growing empirical literature on the empirical relevance of …scal federalism for tax setting. For instance, Feldstein and Matclaf (1987) analyze the impact of U.S. federal tax deductibility on state and local tax setting. Besley and Rosen (1998) focus on the interaction between state and federal excise taxes in the U.S. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2002) and Hayashi and Boadway (2001) assess vertical and horizontal tax interaction in Canada. Baretti et al. (2002) …nd policy incentives to be adversely a¤ected by the equalization system among German states. At the German municipal level, Buettner (2006) and Egger et al. (2007) …nd revenue-sharing systems and …scal capacity equalization to exert an up-ward bias in tax-setting . 3 Dahlby and Wilson (2003) clarify that a tax base overlap may not necessarily lead to overtaxation. If an ad-valorem tax is levied on the supply side of the market, a local tax hike may well increase federal tax revenues provided that the tax-induced market price increase dominates the (negative) quantity response. 4 In particular, the disincentives are due to vertical …scal externalities originating from general equilibrium e¤ects (Dahlby et al.) or the local provision of infrastructure which expands the federal tax base (Hat…eld) .
Suppose the economy consists of symmetric regions which are assigned to two di¤erent federations, each being identically structured. All member regions of a federation are comprised of a private and public sector.
Private Sector
The private sector is modelled by a representative …rm and household. Households receive utility from private consumption, c, and the public consumption goods g and G, according to the wellbehaved utility function u = U (c; g; G). 5 Each household is endowed with a …xed factor (for example, land) denoted by L and a capital stock e k: Private consumption thus equals c = wL + r e k where w denotes the wage rate and r is the interest payment per unit of capital.
The representative …rm in each region produces a numéraire consumption good using the production technology y = f (L; k) where k denotes regional capital employment. Output can be used on a one-to-one basis either as a private consumption good or as a public consumption good. The technology exhibits a positive and declining marginal productivity,
i 2 fL; kg, and inputs are complements in production, f ij (L; k) > 0, i 6 = j, i; j 2 fL; kg.
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Firms are subject to local capital taxation at a rate t which yields local tax revenues T l = tk.
The federal level taxes capital at an ad-valorem rate . 7 A fraction 2 [0; 1] of locally paid taxes is deductible at the federal level which gives a federal tax liability T f = (rk tk). The local and overall e¤ective tax rate (marginal and average) the …rm faces is t (1 ) and t (1 ) + r, respectively.
Firms maximize pro…ts taking prices and tax rates parametrically. Net-of-tax pro…ts read
The …rst-order condition
implicitly de…nes capital demand as a function of the user cost of capital := r + r + t (1 )
Federal tax deductibility lowers the capital sensitivity to local taxation since …rms can deduct a fraction of the local tax burden from the federal tax liability. The capital demand response is downwardly adjusted by a fraction of the value it takes in the absence of a tax deductibility provision.
Following Eq. (1) and the linear homogeneity of the production function, private consumption, c = wL + r e k, can be written as
Public Sector
The public sector in the federation comprises of a local and a federal layer. The upper level recycles tax revenues by providing the public good, G, while the lower-level governments provide the public good, g. G and g are only locally consumed. Both layers tax capital at source. Besides the tax base overlap, federal and local budget is embedded in a nexus of …scal arrangements exempli…ed below.
Local Government
The local budget constraint reads
Lower-level governments collect capital tax revenues tk. They share a fraction 2 [0; 1] of standardized tax revenues with the federal level. Denoting z as the standardized (the average) tax rate, the public funds transferred to the federal government amount to zk. The third term in Eq.
(4) displays entitlement payments due to …scal capacity equalization between member regions of the federation. The system is conditioned on the di¤erence between the average and the region's taxing capacity, k k , multiplied by the standardized tax rate, z. The di¤erence is equalized at a rate 2 [0; 1].
Federal Government
The federal budget B is
Federal funds have two components. The upper level levies a source-based capital tax at an advalorem rate . The tax base is equal to P i rk i , net of the amount of locally-paid taxes …rms are allowed to deduct from the federal tax base,
When r < t own-source capital tax revenues are negative with symmetric local tax rate choices. To save on notation, we con…ne attention to the plausible case that the tax deductibility provision leaves a positive amount of tax revenues in the federal budget:
The last term in Eq. (5) gives the fraction of standardized local tax revenues transferred to the federal budget. Note, since the …scal equalization system is budget-balancing, it does not enter the federal budget constraint. 8 Capital demand in the federation is denoted by K = P i k i . It is decreasing in the federal tax rate,
@K @
< 0, and -to a lesser extent -decreasing in the local tax rate, @K @t i < 0. This is due to the fact that each of the two federal governments is large enough to in ‡uence the capital market interest rate through its tax choice. Indicating variables pertaining to the neighboring federation by asterisks, the capital market equilibrium is
The market clearing condition together with the …rst-order condition (1) implicitly de…nes capital employment and the interest rate as a function of federal and local tax rates.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that federal and local governments choose their tax rates simultaneously (Nash-behavior). 9 The implied sequence of decisions is:
(i ) At a …rst stage, each federal and local government chooses its tax rate for given tax rates of other governments. Governments anticipate how capital demand reacts to tax rate changes.
(ii ) At a second stage, …rms optimize pro…ts given federal and local tax rates.
Applying backward induction we subsequently solve for a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium. Hence, we characterize the local tax rate t (applied in all regions of the two federations) and the federal tax rate (applied by both federal governments) at which no single government has an incentive to deviate and markets are in equilibrium.
E¢ cient Public Policy
Before characterizing equilibrium taxes, we turn to the tax rate choices a uni…ed government (unifying both federations) would implement. Production e¢ ciency requires equal capital tax rates in all regions of the economy; not only within the federation. Allocative e¢ ciency in turn 8 As k is the average capital employment in the federation, local entitlement payments, z k k i , sum up to zero, i.e. P i z k k i 0. 9 Since each local government is small relative to the rest of the economy, it is natural to assume that it takes other governments'taxes as given. The absence of a commitment capacity is less straightforward for the upper level. In Section 5.2 we allow the federal government to pre-commit toward local governments.
dictates public good levels, g and G, satisfying
Both …rst-best allocation rules serve as a benchmark in what follows. Since we con…ne attention to symmetric equilibria -entailing equal tax rates -production e¢ ciency always holds, leaving the magnitude of g and G as the only potential source of ine¢ ciency in local and federal public …nance. Straightforwardly, the e¢ cient structure of public spending (local vs. federal spending)
follows from
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Local Equilibrium Policy
Given , the local government chooses its capital tax rate as to maximize utility of the representative household in the region. Thus, In assuming that each member region is su¢ ciently small relative to the "rest of the federation" the interest rate r and the level of G is given for each region. 10 The …rst-order condition is
where the condition has been simpli…ed using Eq. (1). At the optimum, each region balances the marginal bene…t of higher public good provision to the marginal cost taking the form of lower private consumption.
Intergovernmental …scal arrangements in ‡uence the optimal tax choice as follows. Since a 1 0 Suppose the federation would encompass n symmetric regions. Since each region receives an equal share of the federal funds, we have Combining the e¤ect of both transfer programs, the impact of capital mobility on the local budget reduces to (t z z) @k @t . Also, …rms get a proportion of the local tax burden reimbursed by the federal level which lowers the equilibrium tax base response @k @t by the factor (see Eq. (2)).
Following Eqs. (4) and (7), the optimal provision rule reads
at a symmetric equilibrium, t = z. The right-hand side of Eq. (8) depicts the marginal cost of public funds (henceforth SMCPF) as perceived at the local level which is equated to the marginal willingness to pay for the public good,
Ug
Uc . Note, in the absence of federal …scal arrangements (i.e. = = 0), the SMCPF reduces to 1 1+ > 1; the familiar "race to the bottom" equilibrium in horizontal tax competition. The e¢ ciency of the local tax choice can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 Local public good, g, might be over-, under-or e¢ ciently provided relative to the …rst-best allocation rule, i.e.
Uc T 1: In particular, an overprovision equilibrium is more likely the higher , and .
Proposition 1 suggests that although local government levy a tax on mobile capital, the equilibrium may not feature a "race to the bottom". Horizontal and vertical …scal arrangements insulate local tax policy from incentives of strategically choosing a too low tax rate. In fact, public goods may be overprovided if …scal arrangements are su¢ ciently pronounced as measured by ; and .
We illustrate our …ndings using data from German municipal …nance. We …rst rewrite the local tax base elasticity as = 
Federal Equilibrium Policy
Let V i ( ; t) denote member region's i utility where t is the vector of local tax rates chosen by member regions of the federations. 12 The federal government sets so as to maximize the sum of member-regions' utilities,
The federal …rst-order condition for is V i = 0. Using Eqs.
(1), (3), (4) and (5), rewriting the federal tax as a unit tax 13 , i.e. T = r, and noting
0, the …rst-order condition, evaluated in a symmetric equilibrium, is
As a point of reference the …rst-order condition in the absence of …scal arrangements (i.e.
= = 0) is
A higher federal tax rate reduces private consumption equal to K and the consumption of the For notational simplicity, we do not list the tax rates chosen by non-member regions and the other federal government as arguments of V i ( ). 1 3 We are grateful to Jay Wilson for suggesting the change in notation which simpli…es the expression for the federal marginal cost of taxation. Importantly, since T = r is obeyed at each step of the derivation of (9), the change in notation does not a¤ect federal taxing incentives. This is di¤erent to the literature on the comparison of unit and ad valorem capital taxation; see, e.g., Lockwood (2004) .
locally-provided good g by t @K @T . On the bene…t side, the tax hike increases the consumption of the federally-provided good G by K + T @K @T . The rearranged …rst-order condition reads
denotes the semi-elasticity of federal-wide capital demand K. Capital tax competition upwardly distorts the marginal cost of taxation. The provision rule di¤ers from the expression 1 1+T
> 1 -arising in standard models of tax competition (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986 and Wilson, 1986) . In a two-layer …scal system the federal government "sees through" the budget of local governments in the federation. Hence, the marginal cost of taxation is increased by the negative e¤ect a higher federal tax rate has on public expenditures at the lower level of government.
Evaluated in units of private consumption, the "seeing-through" e¤ect is given by
Taking …scal arrangements into account, the optimal provision rule for the federal consumption good is
The di¤erence between Eqs. (10) and (11) re ‡ects how …scal arrangements alter the marginal cost of taxation perceived by the federal government (right-hand side of Eq. (11), FMCPF henceforth). Federal tax deductibility and vertical revenue-sharing a¤ect the federal tax price threefold.
A rise in (T , respectively) makes the tax deductibility provision …scally more attractive to …rms.
The amount of local taxes, regions can thereby export onto the federal level, increases by t Relating the provision rule (11) to the Samuelson condition (6) and inserting T = r gives:
The federal government chooses an ine¢ ciently low level of federal public good provision; i.e.
The rationale is that under assumption (A), which requires federal capital tax revenues to be positive (i.e. r > t ), we observe ( (r t ) + t) < 0. On net, the federal budget is negatively a¤ected by capital mobility -see Eq. (11). The underprovision equilibrium, which exists in the absence of revenue-sharing and tax deductibility provisions, is preserved in a …scal setting with budgetary …scal arrangements.
14 Proposition 1 and 2 have direct implications for the e¢ ciency of the structure of public spending in the federation. A well received notion is that higher mobility of capital among lower level governments translates into a more severe underprovision of g relative to G, i.e. Interestingly, g may be relatively "overconsumed"although the federal tax base is relatively less elastic, < T < 0. As a counteracting e¤ect to the less elastic tax base, the federal government recognizes the reduced local public consumption level when federal taxes rises -see Eq. (10). To the extent that the "seeing-through"e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, we …nd Provided the local tax base elasticity is not more than twice as large as federal tax base elasticity, g is overprovided relative to G.
We now turn to the e¤ect of and on In particular,
Intuitively, a higher lowers the SMCPF -see Eq. (8) . Hence, local spending g will become more pronounced relative to federal spending G. Similarly, the revenue-sharing rate insulates the local budget from capital mobility; strengthening local taxing incentives. 15 Consequently, both …scal arrangements skew the structure of …scal spending towards local spending.
Finally, we consider the e¤ect of on relative taxing incentives for = 0. Denoting ! as the elasticity of the e¤ective capital tax rate with respect to the federal tax rate, i.e. ! := (8) and (10) imply 1 5 The extent to which in ‡uences the impact of capital mobility on the FMCPF is not decisive for sign(U G =Ug 1). Note, following Eqs. (8) and (10) which is the derivative of the e¤ective tax rate on capital T + (1 )t with respect to T . Next, the impact of federal capital mobility on tax policy can be summarized by (T + (1 )t) which is the sum of the e¤ect of capital mobility on local choices, as measured by t , and the federal budget's exposure to capital mobility (T t) . 16 The e¤ective capital tax rate T + (1 )t thus serves as a proxy for this e¤ect. This e¤ect becomes smaller the higher . If the increase in the e¤ective tax rate following a rise in T is not too large relative to the initially prevailing e¤ective capital tax rate (in the sense that the elasticity ! is su¢ ciently small), g will be overprovided relative to G.
Extensions
In the subsequent analysis we will modify the model in three respects. We …rst consider a federal government which moves prior to the local governments, analyze then the optimal design of …scal institutions, and …nally consider Leviathan-type governments. 1 6 Using Eqs. (8) and (11) the structure of …scal spending is characterized by
: The way federal capital mobility a¤ects the spending structure can be characterized by (T + (1 )t) .
Federal Government as a First-Mover
If the federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader towards local governments the sequence of decisions is:
(i ) At a …rst stage, each federal government chooses its tax rate for given tax rates of governments other than local governments under its jurisdiction. Federal governments anticipate the tax rate choice of local governments of the same federation and how capital demand reacts to tax rate changes.
(ii ) At a second stage, each local government chooses its tax rate for given tax rates of other governments. Local governments anticipate how capital demand reacts to tax rate changes.
(iii ) At a third stage, …rms optimize pro…ts given federal and local tax rates.
Local governments continue to select t according to the provision rule (8) . Let t( ) denote the local tax rate in a symmetric stage-2 equilibrium. At stage 1, the upper level realizes that it can strategically in ‡uence tax rate choices of member regions through their best-response t( ).
Invoking the envelope theorem, and imposing symmetry, the …rst-order condition for reads
It di¤ers from the optimality condition under Nash-behavior (V i = 0) by the second term, re ‡ecting strategic tax incentives. The term V i t j captures the e¤ects of local tax setting on other regions within the federation. The e¤ect is external to the tax-raising local government. For instance, if local taxes are too high from the perspective of the federal government, a local tax rise causes utility in other regions of the federation to drop, i.e. V i t j < 0. 17 Now, if t and are strategic substitutes (complements), the federal government …nds it optimal to increase (decrease) the federal tax so as to alleviate the too pronounced local taxing incentives. Using the terminology by Keen and
The way the federal tax in ‡uences local taxes is endogenous and, in particular, is in ‡uenced by intergovernmental …scal arrangements. Di¤erentiating the local …rst-order condition (7) w.r.t.
the federal and local tax rates, imposing symmetry, and rearranging yields
where < 0 is the second-order condition of the local tax rate choice. In general, the way federal taxes a¤ect local taxes is multi-faceted; being positive or negative in sign. Despite the ambiguity, …scal arrangements impact on the "top-down" tax interaction is some systematic way.
To see this, note that in absence of …scal arrangements only the two last terms in brackets shape the sign of tax interaction. These terms become less important the higher + and vanish completely if + = 1. In this case federal and local taxes are disconnected without federal deductibility of locally paid taxes. As depicted by the …rst term in brackets, the tax deductibility provision positively in ‡uences "top-down"tax interaction and, when + are su¢ ciently high, it will likely induce strategic complementarity between federal and local tax choices, i.e.
dt( ) d
> 0. Thus, Proposition 6 For su¢ ciently pronounced intergovernmental ties ( + ! 1; > 0) a rise in the federal tax implies a rise in local taxes. In this case, a …rst-moving federal government will generically reduce the federal tax below its Nash-level in order to reduce local capital taxes.
If …scal ties are su¢ ciently pronounced, the SMCPF will be close to unity and the federal government views local taxes to be too high. In response, it will generically decrease the federal tax rate below the level it …nds optimal in the absence of a pre-commitment capacity; a tendency which reduces federal service provision relative to the Nash outcome. Finally, note that a federal Stackelberg leadership may not improve e¢ ciency over all decision margins. When local public good provision was e¢ cient initially (due to the existence of …scal ties), the deviation from Nash tax rates impairs e¢ ciency in local public …nance.
Optimal Fiscal Institutions
In this section we ask the question of how the …scal parameters , ; and need to be chosen in order to implement the …rst-best allocation characterized by the Samuelson conditions (6) . We characterize the optimal choice of parameters by …rst assuming that the SMCPF equals unity and solve for the deductibility parameter which gives a FMCPF equal to unity. Given the optimal parameter we solve for the revenue-sharing and equalization rate which yields SMCPF = 1.
Following Eq. (11), the deductibility rate which yields FMCPF = 1 when assuming SMCPF
The optimal deductibility rate is positive. It must be su¢ ciently positive so as to align the "seeing-through" term in (11) to the marginal e¤ect of capital mobility on the federal budget, i.e.
(1 )t = ( (r t ) + t) which guarantees FMCPF = 1.
19 Inserting (12) into the e¤ective federal tax on capital (r t ) shows that the revenues the federal government collects from taxing capital become negative; contrary to what we assumed so far -see assumption (A).
Turning to the SMCPF, Eqs. (8) and (12) give
In order to neutralize the too pronounced local taxing incentives due to the generous deductibility rate (12) the local governments' budget must be partially exposed to capital mobility at the margin. For instance, with a full equalization of …scal capacities ( = 1) the required revenuesharing rate is = t < 0, i.e. the local level receives a federal subsidy on locally-collected capital tax revenues. Irrespective of the combination of and chosen so as to satisfy condition (13) the allocation of expenditures across levels of government will generically not allow an implementation of the …rst-best allocation. For instance, for = 1 conditions (12) and (13) imply that federal total revenues are negative. Hence, the …rst-best allocation can only be decentralized with appropriately chosen lump-sum transfers.
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Proposition 7 The …rst-best allocation (6) can be decentralized (i) when > 1 and + < 1 (according to (12) and (13)) and (ii) when a system of intergovernmental lump-sum transfers is available.
We close this subsection by relating the result more …rmly to the literature. First, the local budgets are not fully insulated from capital mobility, although capital is in …xed supply in the economy. The …nding di¤ers from the optimal choice of …scal institutions when only local government incentives are concerned. As shown by Koethenbuerger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) , local governments should be fully insulated from capital mobility at the margin provided capital is in …xed supply in the economy. The …nding is reproduced here in the absence of a federal layer ( = 0) in which case the optimal choice of the equalization rate is = 1. However, the interplay of local and federal taxing incentives require a deviation from the well-established result (as exempli…ed above). Second, Dahlby et al. (2000) and Hat…eld (2007) characterize the optimal deductibility rate in the absence of capital mobility. Therein, the rationale for a federal deductibility of local taxes is to correct for the e¤ects of local decisions on the federal budget which are external to local governments. Here, it is primarily needed to correct for the ine¢ ciency in federal public good provision due to capital mobility and, thereby, the …scal externality federal policy imposes on residents outside the federation. Note, in order to align the FMCPF (11) to the social cost of public good provision (= 1) the revenue-sharing rate is ine¤ective. It is left to adjustments in the deductibility rate to ensure e¢ ciency in federal decision-making.
Leviathan Governments
In Section 4 we have assumed that governments are benevolent. An alternative view of government motivation is that politicians seek to maximize tax revenues. Capital tax competition is a boon in the presence of Leviathan governments. The magni…ed tax base elasticity e¤ectively constrains the Leviathan in expropriating constituents (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) . In such an environment intergovernmental …scal programs are argued to be opposed on the grounds that they implicitly establish a cartel among competing Leviathans, undermining the boon of decentralized taxation.
In the following we analyze whether the "cartelization hypothesis" applies to taxing incentives at both levels of government.
Di¤erentiating Eq. (4) w.r.t. the local tax rate t and evaluating terms in symmetric equilibrium, a local Leviathan government chooses a tax rate satisfying
where the …rst-order condition has been simpli…ed using z = t. 21 In the absence of …scal arrangements ( = 0) the local government operates at the peak of the locally-perceived La¤er curve, = 1. Revenue-sharing and …scal equalization limit the local budget's exposure to capital mobility. The consequence is that taxing incentives are strengthened the higher and .
Hence, the two …scal arrangements undermine the bane of tax competition at the local level -a …nding which is line with the Brennan-Buchanan "cartelization hypothesis".
Using Eq. (5) and rewriting the federal tax as a unit tax, i.e. T = r, the …rst-order condition for a federal Leviathan government, evaluated in a symmetric equilibrium, is
In the absence of intergovernmental …scal arrangements the …rst-order condition becomes T = 1. The federal government takes the economy to the peak of the federally-perceived revenue hill.
For ease of exposition we subsequently analyze the impact of the …scal parameters and on federal taxing incentives separately. Rearranging Eq. (14) for 0 and > 0, we …nd
The deductibility provision has two counteracting e¤ects on federal taxing incentives. It reduces federal tax revenues by t d dT per unit of capital, while limiting the exposure of the federal Leviathan to capital mobility at a rate t . Since the former e¤ect dominates, the deductibility scheme provides less of an incentive to …scally expropriate constituents. 22 When 0 and > 0 Eq. (14) yields
As becomes evident from (16), the revenue-sharing system exposes the federal budget to more capital mobility which undermines federal taxing incentives. Contrary to the conjecture by Brennan and Buchanan, collusive tax setting does not extend to federal tax policy. Hence, we can summarize:
Proposition 8 With Leviathan-type governments, …scal arrangements strengthen local taxing incentives, while weakening federal taxing incentives.
The revenue-sharing system exerts counteracting e¤ects on local and federal taxing incentives, while the deductibility rate lowers federal taxing incentives and has no …rst-order impact on the local tax choices. From that perspective constituents may well favor the deductibility provision over the revenue-sharing system as a safeguard against …scal expropriation. Related to our …nding, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) point to the welfare-enhancing role of a revenue-sharing mechanism. Therein, tax coordination may bene…t both levels of government (as well as constituents) provided a transfer system is available which ex-post distributes tax revenues among governments appropriately. The transfer system is not explicitly modelled. Here, taxes are still set non-cooperatively and the revenue-sharing system is explicitly modelled. The latter feature allows us to analyze the tax-price e¤ect inherent to such an institutionalized arrangement and its e¤ect on taxing incentives. As shown above, Leviathan governments will generically have nonaligned interests as to the existence of such an institutionalized arrangement. Whether constituents wish to constitutionally anchor a sharing system depends on whether the local or the federal e¤ect on the e¤ective capital tax rate dominates -an issue which we do not formalize here. 23 
Conclusion
The e¤ect of intergovernmental budgetary ties on federal taxing incentives has not received too much attention in the literature. In this paper we analyze how …scal arrangements inherent in federal systems such as revenue-sharing, …scal equalization, and intergovernmental tax deductibility in ‡uence federal policy. While …scal ties give rise to overly pronounced local taxing incentives in tax competition (with the consequence of a local overprovision of public goods), federal public goods will be underprovided in their presence. Fiscal federalism might well upwardly distort the federal cost of taxation and thereby add to the federal government's reluctance to tax mobile capital at source. As to the structure of public spending, when budgetary linkages become …scally more important, the structure of public spending will be skewed toward local spending. In fact, the local public services might be overprovided relative to the federal service. Further, we show that the optimal design of …scal institutions entails that, e.g., local budgets are only partially insulated from capital mobility although capital is in …xed supply.
In the paper we have primarily analyzed how …scal arrangements a¤ect the marginal cost of 2 3 In principle, such an analysis can be performed along the lines suggested in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) .
public funds and, hence, the public good provision rule at both levels of government. In particular,
we have characterized how federal (local) taxes are in ‡uenced by …scal institutions for a given level of local (federal) taxes. Accounting for vertical tax interaction would allow us to pursue an analysis of how tax levels are a¤ected in equilibrium. In general, the characterization of equilibrium tax levels is analytically involved, in particular in the type of model considered here. 24 Albeit being interesting we leave the issue to future research.
Finally, the …nding might be helpful in understanding recent changes in the German federal corporate tax rate and the municipal business tax rate, where the former dropped sharply to a level of about 15% as of 2009, while the latter increased to an average level of 16% at a time when the revenue-sharing programme gradually expanded (Der Landkreis, 2003, and Koethenbuerger, 2005) . The paper's …ndings suggest that the increase in the revenue-sharing rate has increased municipal taxes, while the federal budget has been further exposed to capital mobility. Federal taxing incentives may thus have been undermined. Undoubtedly, the gradual expansion of the revenue-sharing system will no exclusively account for the convergence of tax rates, but may well have contributed to it.
